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Abstract 
 
We report on an on-going project, which asks a number of questions relevant to the 
study of state capacity. What are the main economic and political determinants of 
the state’s capacity to raise revenue and support private markets? How do risks of 
violent conflict affect the incentives to invest in state building? Does it matter 
whether conflicts are external or internal to the state? When are large states 
associated with higher income levels and growth rates than small states? What 
relations should we expect between resource rents, civil wars and economic 
development? The paper is organized into three main sections: 1. The origins of state 
capacity, 2. Sate capacity and the genius of taxation, and 3. State capacity and the 
strategy of conflict. Each of these begins with a specific motivation. A simple model 
is formulated to analyze the determinants of state capacity in the first section, and 
modified to address the new issues that arise in subsequent sections.  The theoretical 
results are summarized in a number of propositions.  We discuss the implications of 
the theory, comment on its relation to existing literature, and briefly mention some 
empiric applications. 
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© The authors. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two 
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, 
including © notice, is given to the source. Analyses of economic development tend to focus on the expansion of the pri-
vate (market) economy. But development also entails a signiﬁcant expansion
in the size and competence of the state. Just as private physical and human
capital accumulation is a key engine of private sector growth, the buildup of
public capital is an engine of state expansion. But a good part of investment
in state eﬀectiveness comes from improving the ability of the state to imple-
ment a range of policies, something which we will refer to as state capacity.
Nowadays, this concept is commonplace in other branches of social science
and in the wider development community. Coined by historical sociologists,
such as Charles Tilly, state capacity originally referred to the power of the
state to raise revenue. However, here we broaden it to capture the wider
range of competencies that the state acquires in the development process,
which includes the power to enforce contracts and to regulate markets.
The paper reports on an on-going project, which asks a number of ques-
tions relevant to the study of state capacity. What are the main economic
and political determinants of the state’s capacity to raise revenue and sup-
port markets? How do risks of violent conﬂict aﬀect the incentives to invest
in state building? Does it matter whether conﬂicts are external or internal
to the state? Are large states associated with lower income levels and growth
rates than small states? What relations should we expect between resource
rents, civil wars and economic development? These questions are now oc-
cupying the attention of many scholars who try to understand patterns of
development across time and place.
The aim of this paper is to set out a simple uniﬁed structure to study these
issues. The framework allows us to think clearly about the forces that shape
the creation of eﬀective states both in raising revenues and in supporting
markets. The paper considers three speciﬁc issues: what makes states to
invest more in their capacities, what leads them to use market supporting
capacity eﬃciently, and how the possibility of external or internal violence
aﬀects these incentives.
The paper has three main sections. The ﬁrst, on the origins of state ca-
pacity, lays out the framework that we adopt and the core modeling choices.
The second section, on state capacity and the genius of taxation, explains
why building state ﬁscal capacity can improve other aspects of policy mak-
ing. The third section, on state capacity and the strategy of conﬂict, turns
to the possibility that the contest for public oﬃce is shaped by violent do-
mestic conﬂict. Using the framework developed in Section 1, we explore the
consequences of conﬂict for investments in state capacity and identify some
2of the channels of inﬂuence.
Each of these sections has a similar structure. It begins with a speciﬁc
motivation. A simple model is formulated to analyze the determinants of
state capacity in the ﬁrst section, and then slightly modiﬁed to address the
new issues that arise in each subsequent section. The theoretical results in
each section are summarized in a few key propositions. We discuss the impli-
cations of the theory, comment on its relationship to the existing literature,
and mention some empirical work. A short concluding section takes stock of
the ﬁndings and suggests topics for further research.
1 The origins of state capacity
Political and economic historians view the state’s capacity to raise revenue as
an important phenomenon in itself, a major explanation for military success
and, more generally, a key to the successful development of nation states
(see e.g., Tilly, 1985, Levi, 1988, or Brewer, 1989). Historically, the tax
systems in countries such as the US, the UK, and Sweden, have indeed been
reformed and expanded in connection with actual or latent external conﬂicts.
Political scientists such as Migdal (1988) have emphasized that one of the
major problems of developing countries is that their states are often too weak
and lack the capacity to raise revenue and to govern eﬀectively.
By contrast, economists generally pay little attention to state capacity.
Researchers in public ﬁnance, political economics, or development rarely as-
sume that a government, which ﬁnds a certain tax rate for a certain tax
base optimal and incentive-compatible, is constrained by ﬁscal infrastruc-
ture. Similarly, economic theory typically does not assume that the state
is constrained by a lack of legal infrastructure, when it comes to enforcing
private contracts or, more generally, supporting private markets.
Presupposing suﬃcient capacities to tax and support markets does not
rhyme well with the experience of many states, either in history or in the
developing world of today. Moreover, international data suggest that the
ability to raise revenue from advanced tax systems is strongly positively
related to the ability to support markets, as well as to the level of economic
development.
Figure 1 is a good starting point to motivate these thoughts. It illustrates
the positive correlations in contemporary data between the share of GDP
raised by an income tax (vertical axis), the ratio of private credit to GDP
3(horizontal axis), and income (blue dots above, and red dots below, median
income). There is no good reason to believe that these correlations can
be interpreted causally. Indeed, our core model’s explanation of them will
emphasize their joint determination with institutions, historical shocks and
initial conditions being common omitted factors that drive all three of these
variables.
The approach that we take follows Besley and Persson (2008a).1 A key
feature of the theoretical approach that follows is to separate government
decisions about resources to enhance the feasible set of policies, and decisions
about the policies themselves. Thus, taxes and market-supporting policies are
constrained by the state’s ﬁscal and legal capacity. We model the expansion of
these capacities as forward-looking investments under uncertainty. A central
result that emerges from the framework, under speciﬁc assumptions, is an
important complementarity between ﬁscal and legal capacity. This implies
that the two forms of state capacity are likely to be positively correlated with
each other and with income, as we ﬁnd in Figure 1.
1.1 Basic model setup
There are two groups. Each comprises half the population in every period
and total population size is normalized to one. For the purposes of this paper,
two alternative timing structures give essentially the same results. In one,
time is inﬁnite and one generation is alive in each period, making investment
decisions based on a warm-glow bequest motive. In the other, which we
will adhere to here, there are just two time periods, s = 1,2, and the world
ends after period 2. Although artiﬁcial, this two-period approach allows us
to make the main points of economic interest.
At the beginning of period 2, the group that held power at the end of
period 1 is the incumbent government, denoted by I1. The other group is
the opposition denoted by O1. Power can be peacefully transferred to the
opposition, which happens with exogenous probability given by parameter
γ. As a result, whoever wins becomes the new incumbent, I2, and whoever
loses becomes the new opposition, O2. At the end of period s, the current
incumbent, Is, sets a tax on the income of each group member denoted by
1Related papers include Acemoglu (2005), where governments can increase their future
tax revenues by spending on public goods, and Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2007) who
study the build up of government bureaucracies. Fiscal capacity has been studied by
Cukierman et al (1992) and legal capacity investment by Svensson (1998).
4tJs, where Js ∈ {Is,Os}. It also chooses a level of legal support for each
group pJs, and spends on general public goods Gs. At the end of period 1,
incumbent I1 also makes investments in next period’s state capacity (see
below). In addition to tax income, the government(s) earns natural resource
rents Rs. These are stochastic and drawn from a two-point distribution
{RL,RH} where Rs = RH with probability ρ in each period. None of the
resource rents accrue directly to the private sector.2 Natural resource rents
will play their most important role in Section 3.
The precise timing of these diﬀerent events are spelled out below.
Individual incomes and utility In period s, individuals consume and







where w( ) is an increasing concave function. The policy variable pJs can be
interpreted in a number of ways. In a broad sense, we view it as a reduced
form for market supporting policies that raise private incomes. This might
include the provision of various forms of physical infrastructures The distinc-
tive feature of policy is that the way capacity is deployed, reﬂected by pJs,
is distinct from the capacity to use the policy, a feature that we introduce
below. Following Besley and Persson (2008a) we will refer throughout to
pJs as if they are policies that aﬀect legal enforcement and raise incomes by
facilitating gains from trade in capital markets.3
Individual utility in period s is linear and described by:
αsGs + c






where cJs is private consumption, and Gs is the level of public goods with
parameter αs reﬂecting the value of public goods. A speciﬁc interpretation
is that Gs denotes spending on external defense and αs the risk of external
conﬂict. We assume that αs has a two point distribution {αL,αH}, with
2We could add private natural resources as accruing additively to private incomes
without any aﬀect on the incentives that we model in this paper. In this case, Rs can be
thought of as the share of rents that accrue to the public sector.
3Besley and Persson (2008a) develop a microfounded model with less than perfect
enforcement (by the state) of collateral in (private) credit-market contracts. The policy
pJs in this context is interpreted as policies that allow greater use of collateral to support
trade in credit markets.
5αH > 2 and αL < 1, and we use φ to denote the probability that αs =
αH. The equality in (1) arises since we assume that individuals do not save
between periods 1 and 2.
Constraints on government Policies are constrained by state capacity.
The levels of ﬁscal capacity τs, and legal capacity πs are inherited from the
previous period. The incumbent group in period 1 chooses these levels for
period 2 subject to the political institutions in place (see below).
In concrete terms, τ represents ﬁscal infrastructure such as a set of com-
petent tax auditors, or the institutions necessary to tax income at source or
to impose a value-added tax — we can think about τ as decreasing the share
of her market income (1 − τ) an individual can earn in the informal sector.
Fiscal capacity does not depreciate, but can be augmented by I1 through
non-negative investments which cost F(τ2 −τ1), where F ( ) is an increasing
convex function with F(0) = Fτ(0) = 0. A higher τs allows the incumbent
Is to charge higher tax rates, such that tJs ≤ τs. To allow for redistribution
in a simple way, we allow negative tax rates.
In concrete terms, π represents legal infrastructure investments such as
building court systems, educating and employing judges and registering prop-
erty or credit. Like ﬁscal capacity, legal capacity does not depreciate, but
can be augmented with non-negative investments at cost L(π2 − π1), where
L( ) is an increasing convex function with L(0) = Lπ (0) = 0. A higher πs
allows government Is to better support private markets with 0 ≤ pJs ≤ πs.








L(π2 − π1) − F(τ2 − τ1) if s = 1
0 if s = 2 . (2)
Political institutions As mentioned above, power can shift exogenously
between the groups. Because the opposition takes over with probability γ,
this parameter becomes a crude measure of political instability.
We assume political institutions make incumbent governments internalize
the preferences of the opposition, to some degree. Speciﬁcally, an incumbent
attaches weights θ to the opposition group and (1−θ) to its own group, where
θ ∈ [0, 1
2]. This parameterization captures, albeit in a simple and reduced-
form way, the representativeness of political institutions through checks and
balances or electoral systems. When checks and balances are very strong, the
6incumbent behaves like a Utilitarian planner — treating both groups equally
— in which case θ = 1
2. At the other extreme, an omnipotent autocrat faces
no executive constraints and behaves as if θ = 0.
Timing Each period has the following timing:
1. The initial conditions are {τs,πs} and the identity of last period’s in-
cumbent Is−1.
2. The value of public goods αs and natural resource rents Rs are realized.
3. Group Is−1 remains in oﬃce with probability 1 − γ.
4. The new incumbent Is determines a vector of tax rates, legal support,







incumbent also chooses state capacities for the next period τ2,π2.
5. Payoﬀs for period s are realized and consumption takes place.
1.2 Equilibrium policy
We begin with the policy choices at stage 4 of period s. Linearity allows us to
study these separately from the choices of state capacity for period 2. With
the assumed policy weights, we can write the objective of incumbent Is as:
V























where we have replaced Gs via the government budget constraint (2), and
where residual revenue zs is deﬁned by
zs = Rs −
 
L(π2 − π1) − F(τ2 − τ1) if s = 1
0 if s = 2 .
This objective is maximized subject to Gs ≥ 0, tJs ≤ τs and pJs ≤ πs.
7Taxation and spending on public goods The simple form of (3) makes
it easy to derive equilibrium ﬁscal policy. Whenever αs = αH > 2(1−θ), it is
optimal for Is to tax its own group maximally, tIs = τs, and use the revenue
to expand Gs. Because Is puts weight θ ≤ 1 − θ on the opposition group, it
also sets tOs = τs. If αs = αL < 2(1 − θ), it becomes optimal to switch to a
redistributive policy, where the opposition is still taxed fully, tOs = τs, but











Thus, whether we have high or low demand for common-interest public goods
is crucial. For high α, the incumbent taxes both groups at ﬁscal capacity and
spends all available revenue (less investment costs if s = 1) on public goods.
When public goods are not very valuable, no public goods are provided and all
available revenue is transferred to the incumbent group (through a negative
tax rate). We refer to αs = αH is the common-interest state, and to αs = αL
as the redistributive state.
The realized value of government funds in period s, which is obtained by
diﬀerentiating V Is with regard to zs in the two cases, is therefore given by
λs = Max[αs,2(1 − θ)] .
Besley and Persson (2008a) emphasize that unless θ = 1
2 the political equi-
librium will underprovide public goods relative to a Utilitarian planner.4
However, given our assumptions about the two potential values of αs, the
underprovision eﬀect is absent here.
Legal protection It is easy to see that (3) is increasing in the legal pro-
tection of each group. Thus, it becomes optimal to exploit any existing legal




Intuitively, the incumbent group can only gain from improving property
rights to both groups, either directly via a higher wage, or indirectly via
a higher tax base. Simple as it is, this production eﬃciency result is in the
4Our assumptions that αH > 2 and αL < 1 ensure that there is always spending
on public goods when αs = αH and transfers when αs = αL which coincides with the
Utilitarian optimum.
8spirit of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). The result does not mean that prop-
erty rights are well protected everywhere, however, since this hinges on the
chosen value of πs. Moreover, Section 2 will identify a set of circumstances
when production eﬃciency fails and the incumbent does not fully exploit
legal capacity for the opposition group.
Even though the setup is a bit diﬀerent, the results on policy are similar
to those in Besley and Persson (2008a). Collecting all of these results, we
have:
Proposition 1 In all states pJs = πs for Js ∈ {Is,Os} and tOs = τs. In
common interest states, Gs = τw(πs)+zs and tIs = τs, while in redistributive
states, Gs = 0 and −tIs = τs + 2 zs
w(πs) .
1.3 Equilibrium state capacity
Preliminaries Using the equilibrium policies in Proposition 1, we can
write the expected future payoﬀ to the incumbent at stage 4 of period 1,
taking as given the state capacity for period 2. This is given by:
E[V
I1(π2,τ2)] = w(π2)(1 − τ2) + E (λ2)[τ2w(π2) + E(z2)] . (4)
where E(λ2) = φαH + (1 − φ)2[(1 − θ − γ(1 − 2θ)] is the expected value of
government funds in period 2, as seen from period 1. As we shall see, E (λ2)
is a key magnitude determining investment incentives.
State capacity choices The choice by incumbent group I1 of state capac-
ity for period 2 maximizes:
E[V
I1(π2,τ2)] − λ1[L(π2 − π1) + F(τ2 − τ1)] , (5)
subject to π2 ≥ π1 and τ2 ≥ τ1. Thus the choice of I1 trades oﬀ the period 2
expected beneﬁts against the period 1 costs of investment, given the realized
value of public funds. When doing so, it takes into account the uncertainties
about the future values of public goods and resource rents, as well as the
prospects of government turnover.
Carrying out the maximization and using (4), we can write the ﬁrst-order
(complementary-slackness) conditions as:
wp(π2){1 + τ2[E(λ2) − 1]} ≤ λ1Lπ(π2 − π1) (6)
9and
w(π2)[E(λ2) − 1] ≤ λ1Fτ(τ2 − τ1) , (7)
where (6) concerns legal capacity and (7) ﬁscal capacity.
Conditions (6) and (7) reproduce, in somewhat diﬀerent notation, the
gist of the results in Besley and Persson (2008a). Since Lπ(0) = Fτ(0) = 0,
it is easy to see that if E(λ2) > 1 there is always positive investment in
both kinds of state capacity. Moreover, in this case which we will focus on
here, ﬁscal and legal capacity are complements. This case will prevail as
long as φ is large enough, i.e. there is a suﬃciently high probability of the
common interest state, or θ is close enough to 1/2 and/or γ < 1/2, i.e., there
is suﬃcient political stability.
Determinants of state capacity If E (λ2) > 1, then the left hand side
of (6) is increasing in τ2, while the left hand side of (7) is increasing in π2.
The resulting complementarity is interesting in its own right. However, it
also simpliﬁes the analysis since it implies that the payoﬀ function (5) is
supermodular. This means that we can use standard results on monotone
comparative statics (see, for example, Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Thus,
any factor that increases (decreases) the expected value of government funds
E(λ2), for given λ1, will increase (decrease) investment in both legal and ﬁscal
capacity. The same is true for any factor that weakly decreases (increases)
the RHS of the two expressions for given E(λ2).
Using (6) and (7) together with the deﬁnition of E (λ2), we establish the
following result:
Proposition 2 Investments in both legal and ﬁscal capacity increase with:
1. wages
2. the share of national income not generated by natural resources
3. the value of public goods
4. the level of political stability and with more inclusive political institu-
tions, as long as political instability is high enough (γ ≥ 1/2)
5. a lower cost of investment in either type of investment (for given π or
τ)
The proof of this and subsequent results is found in the Appendix.
101.4 Implications
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 is consistent with Figure 1, where we saw
that taxation and ﬁnancial development are both positively correlated with
income across countries. However, the result also makes clear that causation
runs from income to market support and taxation, not the other way around.
The result is also consistent with an argument made by Rajan and Zingales
(2003) that ﬁnancial development is positively correlated with openness to
international trade (as the latter expands the returns to reallocating capital).
It is also consistent with their historical evidence that ﬁnancial development
and openness have co-varied over the last century. We return to the relation
between ﬁnancial development and income (growth) below.
Second, Proposition 2 suggests that investment in state capacity is declin-
ing in the share of resource rents in GDP — Rs/Ys = Rs/(w(πs) + Rs) — for
given Ys. This is because we have assumed that only produced output is
taxed and that legal capacity is only useful for produced output.
The third part of Proposition 2 is in line with Tilly’s (1985) claim that
war is important for building ﬁscal capacity, but extends it to legal capacity.
While external defense is a natural example, the result applies to any na-
tional common-interest program, such as a universal welfare state or health
program. If the demand for such public goods or services is expected to be
high, any group that is in power has a greater incentive to invest in ﬁscal
capacity to ﬁnance future common-interest spending.
Part four of the Proposition holds because the incumbent group faces a
smaller risk of the opposition using a larger ﬁscal capacity to redistribute
against the incumbent. The eﬀect of instability is larger, the closer is θ
to zero, i.e. when institutions are less inclusive. Thus, we should not only
observe higher political stability to induce more developed economic insti-
tutions, but a particularly large eﬀect in countries with less representative
political systems. We know of no systematic evidence on such interactions,
but a historical case in point is England after the Glorious Revolution. Dur-
ing a parliament dominated by the Whigs for more than 40 years, tax income
rose to 20% of GDP, and institutions for charging excise and indirect taxes
were put in place (see e.g., Stasavage, 2007, and O’Brien 2005). In the second
half of the 18th century, continued state capacity building by the dominant
British elite culminated in the launch of an income tax during the Napoleonic
wars, when the British government could raise taxes equal to a remarkable
36% of GDP (Mathias and O’Brien, 1976).
11The eﬀect of an increase in the representativeness of political institutions
is more uncertain. It is relevant only when political stability is low enough
as might be the case after a transition to democracy that loosens the grip
of one group on power. When stability is low, increasing inclusiveness works
since more representative political institutions lowers the expected value of
redistribution. As the state becomes more focused on common interests, the
value of ﬁscal capacity goes up and, by complementarity, so does the value
of legal capacity. A long tradition in political science, e.g., Lijphart (1999),
considers proportional electoral systems more consensual than majoritarian
systems, while Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) argue that parliamen-
tary democracies are more representative than presidential democracies. By
the proposition, legal and ﬁscal capacity should be especially higher in such
democracies.
One interpretation of ﬁfth part of the proposition is a theoretical ratio-
nale for legal origins, the subject of many studies following La Porta et al
(1998). If some form of legal origin, such as the common-law tradition, makes
it cheaper to facilitate private contracting, then we would expect this to pro-
mote investments in the legal system. Less trivially, we would also expect the
same legal origin to promote investments in the tax system, because of the
complementarity of legal and ﬁscal capacity.
Correlations in international data Besley and Persson (2008a) explore
the cross-sectional correlations in international data, motivated by results
like Proposition 2, which identiﬁes a number of common determinants of
legal and ﬁscal capacity. 5 First, they take the historical incidence of war as
a proxy for the past demand for common public goods and use data from the
Correlates of War data set to measure the share of all years between 1816 —
or independence, if later — and 1975 that a country was involved in external
military conﬂict. Second, they take the historical incidence of democracy or
parliamentary democracy, as proxies for inclusive political institutions, and
use data from the Polity IV data set to measure the share of years from 1800
(or independence) to 1975 that a country had these institutions. Third, they
consider indicators of legal origin from La Porta et al (1998) as proxies for the
cost of legal infrastructure. To gauge current legal and ﬁscal capacity, they
consider four diﬀerent indicators of each form of state capacity, including
5To facilitate interpretation, all the variables are scaled to lie between 0 and 1. For
more on the data, see Besley and Persson (2008a)
12measures of contract enforcement, protection of property rights, and various
aspects of tax structure.
Besley and Persson (2008a) show that a higher share of external conﬂict
years in the past is always associated with higher measures of legal capac-
ity as well as ﬁscal capacity in the present. Past incidence of democracy
or parliamentary democracy (the two variables are closely related) correlate
positively with both types of state capacity. While English legal origin is
uncorrelated with legal capacity (except when it comes to contract enforce-
ment), German and Scandinavian legal origins do display a robust positive
correlation, not only with legal capacity but also with ﬁscal capacity. Several
determinants identiﬁed by our theory appear to have stable correlations with
the state’s capacity to support markets as well as to raise revenue.
Growth Beyond these direct implications, the model makes a prediction





w(π2) − w(π1) + R2 − R1
w(π1) + R1
.
If we ignore the exogenous resource rents, higher growth is generated solely
by having higher legal capacity and hence better support for private markets.
This would show up in the data as higher TFP.
Legal capacity may be closely related to ﬁnancial development (in the
microfounded model of Besley and Persson, (2008a), e.g., private credit to
GDP is proportional to π). Financial development due to better institutions
can thus cause growth. But the relationship can easily go the other way:
according to the second part of Proposition 2, higher income generally raises
incentives to invest in legal capacity leading to ﬁnancial development.
The complementarity between ﬁscal and legal capacity has interesting
implications for the relationship between taxation and growth. If greater
legal capacity is driven by the determinants suggested by Proposition 2,
we would expect it go hand-in-hand with greater ﬁscal capacity. Variation
in these determinants would tend to induce a positive correlation between
taxes and growth. Even in the case where E(λ2) < 1 (when investment in
ﬁscal capacity is zero), legal capacity and national income are still positively
correlated even though taxation and growth are uncorrelated.6
6However, Besley and Persson (2008a) show that changes in income distribution drive
ﬁscal and legal capacity in opposite directions, inducing a negative correlation between
13These observations relate to recent empirical ﬁndings in the macroeco-
nomics of development. Many researchers have found a positive correlation
between measures of ﬁnancial development, or property-rights protection,
and economic growth (e.g., King and Levine, 1993, Hall and Jones, 1999 and
many subsequent papers), although the ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 warns us
that such correlations may not reﬂect a causal eﬀect of ﬁnancial markets,
but reverse causation. But many researchers who expected to ﬁnd a negative
relation between taxes and growth have found nothing (see e.g., the overview
in Benabou, 1997). Simple though it is, our model suggests a possible reason
for these ﬁndings.
We have focused our modeling on state capacity and hence ignored the
standard engine of growth through private capital accumulation. When one
extends the model with private investment, building ﬁscal capacity does have
a more “standard” disincentive eﬀect on growth because higher τ2 raises ex-
pected taxes and lowers expected net private returns. However, building legal
capacity has an additional positive eﬀect on growth, because it can raise gross
returns to investing, which stimulates private accumulation. With comple-
mentarity between ﬁscal and legal capacity, both kinds of state capacity may
still expand with overall income.
2 State capacity and the genius of taxation
The expansion of government activity and taxation is one of the most striking
economic facts observed over the last century. The causes behind large and
growing government are the subject of much research in economics and other
social sciences, including recent work in political economics. Our approach
oﬀers a distinctive perspective on these issues.
Drawing on broader discussions about government intervention, one ﬁnds
two main opposing perspectives on the growth of government. Some ob-
servers adopt a view rooted in benevolent government, seeing growth of gov-
ernment as a manifestation of the government’s role in redistribution and
correction of market failures, such as the under-supply of public goods. Oth-
ers take a more malevolent view, arguing that large government reﬂects abuse
of power or rent seeking.
Both stylized views stem from somewhat simplistic views about the mo-
tives of governments and the way in which they redistribute resources. The
taxes and growth.
14benevolent government view ignores the reality that some government ac-
tivities are indeed hard to square with social-welfare maximization and that
vested interests play a role in policy formation. The malevolent view tends
to place too much emphasis on the use of taxes in redistribution, ignoring
the fact that, when a tax system is poorly developed, redistribution may be
carried out in much less eﬃcient ways not picked up by conventional mea-
sures of government size. This view also fails to recognize that suppressing
vested interests may not be politically feasible.
In the data, evidence on the costs of large government is mixed. As
mentioned above, it is hard to ﬁnd evidence in macroeconomic studies of
aggregate data that high taxes aﬀects the growth rate. Most microeconomic
studies of individual data also tend to ﬁnd fairly modest behavioral eﬀects
of taxes on investment behavior.
The standard view of government’s role in enhancing growth developed,
for example, by Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) emphasizes
the role that tax-ﬁnanced public capital accumulation, such as building ports
and roads, can play in increasing national income. This is clearly important.
We, however, oﬀer a somewhat diﬀerent focus emphasizing that investments
in ﬁscal capacity can lead to an eﬃciency-enhancing change in the form of
redistribution, diminishing the use of other “regulatory” distortions which
make the economy less productive.
In this section, we develop an example where large government — meaning
high ﬁscal capacity — may be beneﬁcial. By eliminating more costly forms of
redistribution, large government may yield higher production and national
income than small government even if government revenues are used to fund
transfers. The key observation is that redistribution using taxation is gener-
ally less costly than redistribution through distorting the allocation of market
supporting policies. This “genius of taxation” argument is really a positive-
economics application of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) results on production
eﬃciency, which we alluded to in Section 1.2. Government without access
to suﬃcient ﬁscal capacity may choose legal protection in an ineﬃcient way.
Most importantly in a dynamic setting, the resulting ineﬃciency may be an
equilibrium outcome when state capacity is chosen endogenously.
In order to make these points, we extend the basic model in Section 1.1 in
a modest way by adding an additional factor of production which becomes a
source of producer rents. It is these rents that can generate the ineﬃciency.
152.1 A simple two-factor economy
Suppose now that w
 
pJs 
is a form of capital, the productivity of which
depends on property-rights protection for group J in period s. A share of
each group, denoted by σ, are entrepreneurs and have access to a constant-
returns Cobb-Douglas technology that combines capital and raw labor, l, to
produce output. The capital share is denoted by η.7 The remaining 1−σ share
of the population supplies a single unit of raw labor to an economy-wide labor
market. We write the production technology in intensive form as lJs  
kJs η ,
where kJs is the capital-to-labor ratio w
 
pJs 
/lJs. Because aggregate labor













as an increasing function of the property-rights protection of each group. For
an individual capital owner in group Js, the optimal labor demand satisﬁes
the ﬁrst-order condition (1 − η)(kJs)η = ω, where ω is the economy-wide
wage. As the technology is common across groups, the equilibrium wage is







Thus, the wage depends on property-rights protection for the two groups.
Moreover, it is increasing in both of these policy variables, because
∂ω








Intuitively, more productive capital in any sector drives up the demand for
labor which raises the equilibrium wage.













This is the sum of labor income and rental income from owning capital.
Compared to the basic model, income of group Js now depends on the legal
7Assuming a common share σ across groups simpliﬁes the algebra. Relaxing this
assumption makes it easier to prove the possibility of ineﬃcient outcomes (see Propositions
3 and 4). An incumbent group, I, with a large share σI of capital owners is more willing
to select ineﬃcient policies to boost the group’s rents than is a group with a small share.
16protection of the other group as well, through the endogenous equilibrium
wage. The latter has a positive eﬀect on group members with raw labor (the
ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (9)), but a negative eﬀect on those earning
quasi-rents on their capital (the second term on the right hand side).
2.2 Policy and state capacity
For the rest, the model works exactly as in Section 1. To analyze optimal
policy, we replace w(pJs) in (3) by the newincome function yJs(pIs,pOs) in (9).
The main consequence is that, if σ is high enough, then an incumbent group
Is may prefer to keep wages low. Moreover, the ruling group can engineer a
lower wage by blocking the opposition group’s access to legal capacity and
hence driving down the demand for labor.
Going through similar steps to those in Section 1.2, we can show:
Proposition 3 If θ = 1
2 or τs = 1, then legal capacity is always fully utilized
for both groups. There exists a threshold   τ(θ,α), such that the legal protection
of the opposition group is minimal: pOs = 0 for all τs <   τ(θ,α), and where
  τθ(θ,α) < 0, and   τα(θ,α) < 0 if α = αH.
This result says that there is always production eﬃciency in the Utili-
tarian case, or when ﬁscal capacity is high enough. However, when ﬁscal
capacity is below a critical threshold, a politically motivated incumbent may
prefer an ineﬃcient policy which lowers the level of national income. In this
speciﬁc example, maximizing (gross) income and using the tax system for re-
distribution may be less useful to the incumbent than distorting production
and raising quasi-rents by maintaining a supply of low-wage labor.8
Proposition 3 shows that the critical threshold for ﬁscal capacity depends
on institutions and circumstances. When political institutions are more in-
clusive, as parameterized by a higher θ, existing ﬁscal capacity must be lower
to trigger ineﬃciently low legal protection for the opposition. Similarly, in a
common-interest state, with αs = αH > 2(1 − θ), the critical threshold for
ﬁscal capacity is lower than in a redistributive state.
8There is an analogy here with Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) who argue that production
eﬃciency is desirable if a tax system is suﬃciently rich. One of the assumptions required
in their framework is that there be 100% taxation of pure proﬁts. In our model all income
is taxed at the same rate and hence τs = 1 is eﬀectively equivalent to full taxation of pure
proﬁts (the rents on capital).
17The observation that limited powers to use taxation for redistribution
can lead to distorted factor markets is not new. In particular, this line of
argument is developed by Acemoglu (2006). However, to provide a complete
explanation requires some understanding of why the state lacks the power to
tax. This can be addressed only if ﬁscal capacity is endogenous.
The results from the previous section, particularly Proposition 2, give us
a stepping stone for the required analysis. We now apply this logic to un-
derstand why τ can remain low (below the threshold required for production
eﬃciency). Our key result is
Proposition 4 Suppose that τ1 < ˆ τ (θ,αL). Then, for φ close enough to
zero, there is a range of γ > 1/2 such that τ2 = τ1, and investment in legal
capacity is lower than it would be if τ1 > ˆ τ (θ,αL).
An immediate corollary of Propositions 3 and 4 is that, whenever initial
ﬁscal capacity fulﬁlls τ1 <   τ, the opposition group in each period is not
fully protected by the legal system. When political instability is high, the
incumbent in period 1 does not want to expand the ability to tax, because
it fears that such ability will be used to redistribute against its own group.
As a result of the weak state, any period-2 incumbent uses ineﬃcient legal
protection to generate rents to the capital owners of its own group.
Proposition 4 thus describes an “investment trap”, where political insta-
bility makes an incumbent group expect that larger state capacity will be
used against its own interests. That expectation perpetuates an ineﬀective
apparatus for tax raising, which causes ineﬃciencies in production. The situ-
ation persists because the probability of the common interest state (αs = αH)
is low.
2.3 Implications
We now develop some implications of these results for growth rates and the
level of income. First, deﬁne the non-resource part of GDP as






With an ineﬃcient regulatory policy in period s, income becomes Y (πs,0),
where by symmetry Y (πs,0) = Y (0,πs). This is clearly lower than the level
with eﬃcient legal protection Y (πs,πs).
18Now consider two economies S and L, where Propositions 3 and 4 apply.
Assume that the same initial legal capacity πS
1 = πL
1 = π1 prevails in both,
but τS
1 <   τ(θ
S,αL) and τL
1 >   τ(θ
L,αL) so that the economies ﬁnd themselves
at opposite sides of the ﬁscal-capacity threshold, either because of diﬀerent
initial ﬁscal capacities, τS
1 < τL
1, or because of diﬀerent inclusiveness in po-
litical institutions,  τ(θ










1 = Y (π1,π1) − Y (π1,0) > 0 ,
i.e., in period 1, economy S has a lower income level due to the ineﬃcient










2) − Y (π
S
2,0) > Y (π1,π1) − Y (π1,0) ,
where the inequality follows from the fact that πL
2 > πS
2. Due to its low ﬁscal
capacity, economy S pursues a policy of less eﬃcient legal protection than
economy L in period 2, whichever group is in power. But Proposition 4 tells
us that economy S has also invested less in legal capacity than economy L.
The larger state not only has the higher GDP level, but its income advantage
to the smaller state is growing over time.
These implications of Proposition 3 and 4 suggest another possible inter-
pretation of the correlations in Figure 1. Using the results in Section 1, we
may observe large government together with high income because the two
are jointly determined by other factors, or because high income causes large
government (recall Proposition 2). The results in this section suggest that
a large state can actually cause high income, to the extent it limits policies
that distort production.9
It is interesting to think about what may be ways out of ineﬃcient legal
protection or an investment trap? Propositions 3 and 4 suggests two possible
answers: political reform and exogenous circumstance. Political reform that
introduced more inclusive political institutions (a higher value of θ) may
shift the boundary value   τ(θ,α) below existing ﬁscal capacity. A reform that
diminished political instability (lower value of γ) may also induce ﬁrst-period
investment. Exogenous circumstance, such as a higher likelihood or expected
severity of external conﬂict (higher φ or αH), may make it too costly to pursue
9Of course, our caveat noted above about not considering tax distortions still applies.
19ineﬃcient legal protection by raising the prospect of a future common-interest
state.
Let us return brieﬂy to the work on political origins of ﬁnancial develop-
ment mentioned in Section 1, which argues that a desire to create or preserve
rents can prevent a ruling elite from building the institutions needed for well-
functioning ﬁnancial markets (see e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 2003 or Pagano
and Volpin, 2005). This work generally considers the ﬁnancial sector without
reference to the tax system. So, the political-origins argument may implicitly
assume a lack of ﬁscal capacity, which makes it unattractive for the incum-
bents to invest in private markets, maximize income, and instead carry out
its desired redistribution via taxes and transfers. As stressed by Acemoglu
(2003, 2006), it is important to pose the political Coase-theorem question
explicitly, and our analysis here suggests a new way of doing so. But the key
innovation is to think of both aspects of state capacity as evolving together
and inﬂuencing policy incentives.
We believe that the argument is much more general than the speciﬁc
example in this section. Further work might consider the joint determination
of weak states and other policy-induced production distortions, such as tariﬀs
or red-tape regulation.
3 State capacity and the strategy of conﬂict
Our discussion about the origins of state capacity highlighted the risk of
external conﬂict as a possible interpretation of αs. But all conﬂict is not ex-
ternal — internal conﬂicts plague many states particularly in the third world.
Counting all countries and years since 1950, the incidence of civil war is about
6%, with a yearly peak of more than 12% (in 1991 and 1992), according to
the Correlates of War data set. Figure 2a shows the variable time path of the
worldwide prevalence of civil war. The cumulated death toll in civil conﬂicts
since the Second World War exceeds 15 million (Lacina and Gledtisch, 2005).
The causes of civil war are subject to a large theoretical and empirical
literature in political science and economics (see e.g., Sambanis, 2002 and
Blattman and Miguel, 2009 for broad reviews). A robust empirical fact is
that poor countries are disproportionately more likely to be involved in civil
war, even though the direction of causation may be diﬃcult to establish.10
10Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) use weather shocks to instrument for growth
in African countries from the 1980s and onwards, and ﬁnd that lower growth raises the
20The concentration of internal conﬂict in poor countries is shown in Figure
2b, which plots the share of years with civil war since 1950 (or independence,
if later) against GDP per capita in the year 2000. Civil war is thus closely
linked to development. There are two leading interpretations of this correla-
tion in the literature: Fearon and Laitin (2003) see conﬂict in poor countries
as reﬂecting limited state capacity to put down rebellions, while Collier and
Hoeﬄer (2004) see it as reﬂecting lower opportunity costs of ﬁghting in low-
income economies. There is also considerable debate about other suggested
drivers of civil war, such as natural resource rents, ethnic conﬂicts, and po-
litical institutions.
The civil war literature typically treats variables such as incomes and
state capacity as exogenous. A fuller understanding of these issues needs a
theory where dynamic incentives to increase state capacity are considered
in light of the propensity of future conﬂict. The route we take in this sec-
tion is to recognize that the redistributive state when αs = αL may lead to
competition for state control, as the winner becomes a residual claimant on
public resources. While external conﬂict can be described mainly as a source
of common interests across groups in a state, internal conﬂict is a graphic
manifestation of conﬂicting interests across groups. As Besley and Persson
(2008b) argue — theoretically and empirically — the two forms of conﬂict may
therefore have opposite eﬀects on the incentives to invest in ﬁscal capacity.
Our analysis also contributes to discussions of the “resource curse” —
the claim that resource-rich countries tend to grow more slowly. A possible
reason is that resource rich countries tend to be more conﬂict prone.11 Here,
we highlight a possible mechanism working through investments in state
capacity.
To make these points, we marginally extend the framework in Section 1 by
allowing for the possibility that public and private resources are used to gain
control of the state. We then consider how the possible future deployment of
resources to conﬂict aﬀects the incentives of a current incumbent to invest in
state capacity.
probability of civil conﬂict.
11See Ross (2004) for a survey of the research on natural resources ansd civil war.
213.1 Conﬂict and takeover
We assume that power may be transferred peacefully, as was implicitly the
case in Section 1, as well as after a violent conﬂict where each group raises
an army to ﬁght. To be speciﬁc, we suppose that the incumbent can raise an





where 0 < AI < 1 (the size of the total population is unity). This discrete-
choice formulation, which is relaxed in Besley and Persson (2008c), is some-
what artiﬁcial but makes the analysis simpler. There is no conscription, so
soldiers are simply compensated for their lost income. The army, which costs
wIs−1δ
Is−1, is ﬁnanced out of the public purse. Decisions on the army is sub-
ject to the same political constraints as decisions on policy. Hence, as above,
the incumbent policy maker internalizes the preferences of the opposition
group using weight θ.12





with 0 < AO < 1, which it uses to mount an insurgency to take over the
government. When in opposition, we assume that each group has the capacity
to tax its own citizens in order to ﬁnance a private militia. The decision on
δ
Os−1 is made by the opposition group and is not subject to any political
constraints, but the resources have to be raised within the group.








This depends on the resources devoted to ﬁghting. We assume that γ is
increasing in its ﬁrst argument and decreasing in the second. Below, we
assume a speciﬁc functional-form, which yields a closed-form solution.
There are thus two substantive changes to the model described in Section
1.1. First, the government budget constraint has to be rewritten to reﬂect






− Gs + zs − w
Is−1δ
Is−1 . (10)
12This formulation diﬀers slightly from Besley and Persson (2008c) who assume that
institutional constraints bind ex post rather than ex ante. However, the results are quite
similar.
13This formulation assumes that resource revenues are large enough to ﬁnance the in-
cumbent’s army or, alternatively, that the new incumbent pays for the army ex post,
honoring any outstanding "war debts".
22Second, stage 3 in the timing is replaced by the sequence:
3a. Group Os−1 chooses the level of any insurgency δ
Os−1.
3b. The incumbent government Is−1 chooses the size of its army δ
Is−1.






We interpret civil war in this setting as δ
Os−1 = AO and δ
Is−1 = AI, i.e. both
groups are raising armies.
3.2 Incidence of civil war and repression
Preliminaries It is easy to show that the (new) incumbent’s policy choices
at stage 4 of each period in Proposition 1 still apply. We can use this to write
the government’s objective function after the resolution of uncertainty over
αs and Rs has been realized at the end of stage 2, but prior to the choice of
armies at stage 3. For the incumbent at stage 3b, the appropriate expression
depends on the realized value of αs and is given by
E[V
Is−1(πs,τs) | αs = αH] = αH[τsw(πs)+zs−w(πs)δ
Is−1]+w(πs)(1−τs)
(11)
and, after some algebra, we also have
E[V
Is−1(πs,τs) | αs = αL] = w(πs)(1 − τs) (12)
+
 







2[τsw(πs) + zs − w(πs)δ
Is−1] .
Unconstrained by any common political institution, the opposition chooses
its army δ
Os−1, at stage 3a, to maximize the group’s expected utility. This
also depends on αs and is given by
E[V











2[τsw(πs) + zs − w(πs)δ
Is−1]
+w(πs)(1 − τs − δ
Os−1) . (14)
Equilibrium armies We now characterize the sub-game perfect equilib-





. We begin by stating a useful (if perhaps obvious) result:
23Proposition 5 There is never any conﬂict when αs = αH :   δ
Os−1




Intuitively, all spending will be on common-interest goods independently
of who holds power, so there is nothing to ﬁght over.
In redistributive states, αs < 2(1 − θ), the situation is diﬀerent. The
payoﬀs (12) and (14) reveal a basic underlying trade-oﬀ: decision makers
must weigh the opportunity cost of higher armed forces against a higher
probability of takeover and control over the redistributive cake. To study
that trade-oﬀ we make
Assumption 1











(b)  AI ≤ γO ≤ 1 −  AO
(c) 1
2 + γO −  AI ≥ 1−θ
1−2θ .
Part (a) says that a “linear probability model” governs the outcome of any
conﬂict, while the peaceful turnover rate is γO. Restriction (b) on parameters
guarantees a probability of turnover strictly between 0 and 1, and will hold if
  is small enough. Restriction (c) says that the peaceful turnover probability
γ0 are large enough, or the political weight on the opposition θ is small
enough. Essentially, this deﬁnes the parameter range in this model where
conﬂict is a real threat.
Given Assumption 1, we get a straightforward characterization of conﬂict





as the ratio of total government revenue per capita to the real wage (non-
resource share of GDP). Next, deﬁne a lower and an upper bound for this
variable:
Z =
(1 − θ) − γO (1 − 2θ)
(1 − 2θ) 
+ A






Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and αs = αL (a redistrib-
utive state), then there are three possibilities.






2. If Z ≤ Z (zs;πs,τs) ≤ Z, then the state is repressive with   δ
Os−1
= 0
and   δ
Is−1
= AI.
3. If Z (zs;πs,τs) < Z, then there is peace with   δ
Os−1
= 0 and   δ
Is−1
= 0.
If Z (zs;πs,τs) is very high which corresponds to low wages (low πs), high
ﬁscal capacity, high natural resource rents, or non-inclusive political institu-
tions, then there is a conﬂict because it is cheap to ﬁght and there is a lot
to redistribute so that the winner of conﬂict gets a share of a larger cake.
If Z (zs;πs,τs) is in an intermediate range, then the government represses
the opposition to increase the probability that it stays in power. Finally, if
Z (zs;πs,τs) is low enough, then there is peace.14
This proposition gives a link between natural resource rents, real wages,
and the likelihood of conﬂict. For given state capacities (πs,τs), the variable
Zs varies stochastically with natural resource rents, Rs and real wages, ws.
By this route, we expect commodity prices to predict civil war. Besley and
Persson (2008c) explore the empirical link between commodity prices and
the incidence of civil conﬂict. Using trade volume data from the NBER-UN
Trade data set, and international price data for about 45 commodities from
UNCTAD, they construct country-speciﬁc commodity export and commodity
import price indexes for about 125 countries since 1960.15 According to
the open-economy model in Besley and Persson (2008c), higher export price
index can be interpreted as a positive shock to natural resource rents, and a
higher import price index as a negative shock to (real) income. In line with
Proposition 6, they ﬁnd a robust empirical link between these price indexes
and the incidence of civil war.
Proposition 6 also suggests that government repression and civil war may
reﬂect the same underlying determinants, namely resource rents, real wages
14The parameter restriction in Assumption 1c, is the reason that the ordering is straight-
forward. In Besley and Persson (2008c), we also obtain an ordering result of this form
(under weaker assumptions) in a related model where the choice of armies is continuous
and institutions constrain the behavior of the incumbent and opposition ex post. For
some parameter restrictions, it is possible to have an outcome where the government does
not defend against an insurgency (passive acceptance of terrorism).
15The price indexes for a given country have ﬁxed weights, computed as the share of
exports and imports of each commodity in the country’s GDP in a given base year.
25and political institutions. Indeed, the proposition suggests that the regimes
of peace, repression, and civil war can be looked upon as ordered states.
Interpreting government repression as infringements on human rights, Besley
and Persson (2009) push this argument further and estimate the likelihood
of observing these two states as an ordered probit.
3.3 Investment in state capacity
Our analysis in Section 3.2 takes legal and ﬁscal capacity as given. The next
step is to ask how the risk of civil war aﬀects the incentive to invest in state
capacity, to deepen our understanding of how conﬂict shapes the prospects
for state development.
When there is no risk of future civil war, the analysis in Section 1.3
applies with γO = γ. To simplify the algebra, while highlighting the new
mechanisms added by the possibility of conﬂict, we assume that the period 1
incumbent knows for sure that the value of public goods in the future is low,
i.e., that α2 = αL so that there is a risk of conﬂict. Except for the uncertain
future incumbency, the only remaining uncertainty is thus about the level of
natural resource rents. There are now two main eﬀects to consider that are
additional to those that we found in the non-conﬂict model.
The ﬁrst of these comes from observing that conﬂict changes the probabil-
ity that the incumbent group will stay in power and hence aﬀects the political
discount factor. To see this formally, we can use the result in Proposition 6





γO +  
 
AO − AI 
if Z (R2;π2,τ2) > Z




γO Z (R2;π2,τ2) < Z.
This probability depends on the exogenous level of resource rents, and on
the endogenous levels of state capacity. This probability is not monotonic in
the level of natural resources; survival is largest in the middle range where
the government represses the opposition. Whether outright conﬂict leads to
more or less political instability than peace depends upon whether AO ￿ AI.
The second eﬀect of adding conﬂict to the model comes from the fact
that the incumbent government has to pay the real market wage to employ
the soldiers in its army. Thus, it may be more reluctant, all else equal, to
raise incomes by investing in legal capacity (or any other institution raising
the wage).
26We consider two cases. In Case 1, a country cycles between peace and
civil war whereas in Case 2 it cycles between repression and civil war.
Case 1: Z (RH;π2,τ2) > Z > Z > Z (RL;π2,τ2) In this case, the prize
from winning a conﬂict is high enough for the both the incumbent and the
opposition to arm when resource rents are high, whereas neither of them
wants to arm when resource rents are low. Implicitly, we thus assume that
variations in investment in ﬁscal capacity τ2 are never large enough to induce
changes in the conﬂict regime.
Under these assumptions, and following the same approach as in Section
1, we can write the payoﬀ of the period-one incumbent controlling the state-
capacity investment decisions as:
E[V
Is(π2,τ2) | αs = αL] = w(π2)(1 − τ2)
+E (λ2)[τ2w(π2) + E (z2)]
−ρ
 














where the expected value of future government funds is given by E (λ2) =  








2. As in Section 1, we focus on the
case where E (λ2) > 1 so that investments in both kinds of state capacity
remain complements.16 Compared to our earlier expression (4) in the baseline
(no-conﬂict) model in Section 1, there is a new term on the third line which
captures the cost of conﬂict. It is multiplied by ρ to reﬂect the fact that
conﬂict occurs only when resource rents are high.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for investments in legal and ﬁscal capacity are:
wp(π2)
 
{1 + τ2[E(λ2) − 1]} − ρ
 













≤ λ1Lπ(π2 − π1) (16)
w(π2)[E(λ2) − 1] ≤ λ1Fτ(τ2 − τ1) . (17)
We focus on the situation where AI ≈ AO which implies that the eﬀect of
conﬂict on political turnover is negligible as is the eﬀect of ρ, the probability of
conﬂict, on the expected value of public funds E (λ2). Then, the only eﬀect on
16Note, however, that an increase in ρ (now the probability of conﬂict since conﬂict
occurs when natural resource rents are high) may increase or decrease the future expected
value of public funds. Depending on the relative values of AI and AO, this can raise or
cut the likelihood that state capacities are substitutes rather than complements.
27investments of a higher probability of conﬂict comes from the second term on
the left-hand side of (16). Evidently, a higher ρ reduces the marginal return
to investing in legal capacity. Taking the complementarity into account, we
now have:
Proposition 7 Suppose that the future state is always redistributive (α2 =
αL), there is either conﬂict or peace depending on the level of natural resource
rents, and that AI ≈ AO. Then, an exogenous increase in the probability of
conﬂict, via a higher value of ρ, reduces the incentive to invest in both ﬁscal
and legal capacity.
When AI ≈ AO equilibrium political turnover is not changed, and conﬂict
is Pareto inferior as it simply results in resources being spent without any
material change in who holds power. Proposition 7 shows that the static
ineﬃciency of conﬂict is compounded by a dynamic ineﬃciency through a
lower incentive to invest in state capacity. This gives one underpinning of
the link between conﬂict propensity and weak states.
Case 2: Z (RH;π2,τ2) > Z > Z (RL;π2,τ2) > Z In this case, changes
in resource rents cycle the economy between repression and civil war: the
incumbent always ﬁnds it optimal to arm while the opposition only arms
when resource rents are high. In this instance, the probability of high resource
rents, ρ, has a direct eﬀect on the discount factor of the period-one incumbent,
even if AI ≈ AO.
Now, the expected payoﬀ to the incumbent is:
E[V
Is(π2,τ2) | αs = αL] = w(π2)(1 − τ2) (18)
+E (λ2)
 
τ2w(π2) + E (z2) − w(π2)A
I 
,
where E (λ2) =
 









The ﬁrst-order conditions for investing in state capacity become:
wp(π2)
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≤ λ1Lπ(π2 − π1) (19)
w(π2)[E(λ2) − 1] ≤ λ1Fτ(τ2 − τ1). (20)
Again, we can contemplate the eﬀect of a change in ρ on the incentive to
invest. From the ﬁrst-order conditions, we have:
28Proposition 8 Suppose that in the future state is always redistributive (α2 =
αL) and there is either conﬂict or repression depending on the level of natural
resource rents. Then, an increase in the exogenous probability of conﬂict, via
a higher value of ρ, reduces the marginal incentive to invest in both ﬁscal and
legal capacity.
The result follows again by complementarity, and by noting that a higher
value of ρ decreases the left hand side of both (20) and (19), the latter
because ∂LHS
∂ρ = −2(1 − 2θ) AO(1 − AI) < 0. Intuitively, the direct eﬀect
on the discount factor always outweighs the eﬀect on the expected value of
ﬁghting.
This result is analogous to part four of Proposition 2, whereby higher
political instability reduces investments in state capacity. However, the in-
stability is now modeled as an equilibrium outcome, where conﬂict (relative
to repression) makes it less likely that the incumbent survives. Again, this
result gives a theoretical underpinning to the notion that the prospect of
conﬂict can underpin the perpetuation of weak states both in raising taxes
and supporting markets.
3.4 Implications
Cases 1 and 2 above highlight two key mechanisms. They show how the
possibility of conﬂict endogenously leads to states remaining weak with lower
levels of wage income as a consequence. Our examples have focused on
marginal incentives within a regime (corresponding to the assumptions that
are maintained for the sake of deﬁning out two cases). Proposition 6 deﬁnes
a threshold above which conﬂict ends. In this case, a government may strive
for a big enough investment in legal capacity to raise wages so as to generate
peace. To the extent that this is important, we might expect incentives to
go in the opposite way of those driving the results in Propositions 7 and 8.
There may then be scope for a “big push” to raise wages and to break out
of the conﬂict trap.
The results provide a further reﬂection on the empirical literature on civil
war mentioned in the introduction to this section. Our model suggests why it
may be hazardous to consider the correlation between poverty and civil war
as reﬂecting a causal eﬀect from poverty to the incidence of conﬂict. Indeed,
the theory suggests that the two leading explanations of this correlation —
low opportunity cost of ﬁghting due to low wages, and low state capacity
29in poor countries — may both reﬂect common omitted factors rather than a
causal mechanism. The results in this section illustrate the possibility that
low state capacity in terms of raising tax revenue, as well as low wages,
may be simultaneously determined with a high probability of civil war by
factors such as high resource rents, or non-inclusive political institutions.
This provides a note of caution for researchers who pursue empirical studies
of the determinants of civil war.
More generally, this section illustrates the interesting but complex inter-
actions between, state capacity, conﬂict and development. However, it also
illustrates the logic of some common-sense propositions such as how success-
ful political reform that diminishes the incidence of conﬂict can have dynamic
beneﬁts that strengthens state capacities.
4 Final remarks
In politics, history and sociology, state capacity is viewed as an important
object of study. We have illustrated some simple ways of bringing the study
of state capacity and its determinants into mainstream economics. In the
development community, a lack of state capacity is often cited as a major
obstacle to development. We have shown that legal capacity can be crucial
for economic growth (in Section 1), that lack of ﬁscal capacity can contribute
to low income (in Section 2), and that lack of legal capacity can contribute
to the likelihood of civil war (in Section 3). Our analysis also suggests an
important complementarity between these two forms of state capacity. This
complementarity is a natural way to think about the clustering of institu-
tions that appears to be a common feature of countries at diﬀerent levels of
development.
A few common themes emerge from the theoretical analysis in Sections
1 through 3. First, the institutional arrangements aﬀecting public resource
allocation, represented in the model by θ, shape not only static policy in-
centives — determining the likelihood of a common-interest state — but they
also have an impact on dynamic state development. Similarly, the level of
economic development at a point in time aﬀects policy outcomes, but also
feeds dynamic state development. Finally, realized and prospective shocks to
public revenues and public-good preferences have both static and dynamic
eﬀects on policies and state development.
We have highlighted the distinction between circumstances where the
30state is mainly used as a vehicle to pursue common-interest goals and cir-
cumstances where it is mainly used to redistribute income. With this dis-
tinction, (threats of) external and internal conﬂict have opposite eﬀects on
the incentives to invest in state institutions.
Although our theory has already helped us approach the data in novel
ways, the model and the variations we have developed are very simple. To
understand better the long-run forces of development, it would be valuable
to add private capital accumulation and go to develop a fully-ﬂedged dy-
namic framework. Another natural extension would be to endogenize politi-
cal institutions. Given the history of today’s developed states, a reasonable
conjecture — in line with some work in political science — is that the demand
for more representative government increases with state capacity. This sug-
gests the possibility of a complementarity between political and economic
institutions, which deserves further study.
Its simplicity notwithstanding, we view the research agenda presented
here as a ﬁrst step towards disentangling some of the complex interactions
between state capacity, conﬂict and development.
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345 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 Part 1 refers to a multiplicative upward shift of
the wage function w( ), as this raises both w(π2) and wp(π2) for any given
π. Part 2 follows by observing that
∂E(λ2)
∂φ = αH − 2[1 − θ − γ (1 − 2θ)] > 0.
To prove parts 3 and 4, we observe that
∂E(λ2)
∂γ = −(1 − φ)2(1 − 2θ), and
∂E(λ2)
∂θ = (1 − φ)2(2γ − 1), which is positive as long as γ ≥ 1/2. Finally, 5
refers to a multiplicative downward shift of either cost function L( ) or F( ).
￿









Hence, for all pIs > pOs
∂yIs(pIs,pOs)
∂pIs =
   
































































Thus, there is a conﬂict of interest between creating property rights for the
ruling group and the non-ruling group.
In general, we can write the part of the government’s objective function
























2 −θ) if α ≥ 2(1 − θ)
(1−θ)
θ+τ(1−2θ) otherwise .
It is easy to check that ψ (θ,α) is decreasing in θ and τ, and also decreasing in
α if α ≥ 2(1−θ). Moreover, as τ → 1 and/or θ → 1/2, ψ → 1 (independently



























From this, we conclude that as τ → 1 and/or θ → 1/2, pIs = pOs = πs, i.e.,
production eﬃciency obtains, since the incumbent maximizes total income
yIs(pIs,pOs) + yOs(pIs,pOs). Moreover, as θ → 0 and τ → 0, then ψ → ∞
and the incumbent maximizes its own group’s income yIs(pIs,pOs), such that
pIs = πs and pOs = 0. The existence of the critical threshold now follows
from the intermediate value theorem, given that ψ(θ,α) is continuous in θ on
[0,1/2]. The property that   τθ(θ,α) < 0 follows since ψ is decreasing in both
θ and τ, while   τα(θ,α) < 0, when α ≥ 2(1−θ), follows since ψ is decreasing
in α in that domain. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4 To prove the proposition, we note some useful
preliminaries. It is straightforward to check that the income function has a
convenient quasi-linear form:
ˆ y




























denote equilibrium wages when the incumbent sets legal protection eﬃciently
(ω (πs)) and ineﬃciently (ω (πs)). It is easy to check that ω (πs) > ω (πs).
The incumbent maximizes the expected period 2 beneﬁts
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2 + [(1 − 2θ)γ − θ](1 − τ2)
 
 
+(1 −  )
  
((1 − γ) − θ(1 − 2γ)) ˆ yI2 (π2,αL)+
[(1 − 2γ)θ + γ − τ2 (1 − 2γ)(1 − 2θ)] ˆ yO2 (π2,αL)
  
.
less the investment costs in period 1. The marginal beneﬁts with regard to
the two choice variables are :
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((1 − γ) − θ(1 − 2γ)) ˆ yI2
π (π2,αL)+




If   → 0 and γ > 1/2, we have that:
Γτ (π2,τ2) = (1 − 2γ)(1 − 2θ) ˆ y
O2 (π2,αL) < 0 ,
37which implies that τ2 = τ1. Moreover, as γ → 1/2
Γπ (π2,τ2) =
 
((1 − γ) − θ(1 − 2γ)) ˆ yI2
π (π2,αL)+

















< σwp (πs)ψ (  ω (πs)) .
This proves the result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5 The relevant objective functions when αs = αH >
2(1 − θ), (11) and (13), are strictly decreasing in δ
Is−1 and AOs−1, respec-
tively. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6 To solve for the equilibrium in Proposition 6,
ﬁrst observe that (using 12) the incumbent will set δ
Is−1 = AI if:
 (1 − 2θ)Z (zs;πs,τs) ≥ (1 − θ) −
 
γ





(1 − 2θ) .
This implies that a suﬃcient condition for δ
Is−1 = AI is that
Z (zs;πs,τs) ≥ Z .
We will show that this is also necessary.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for δ
Os−1 = AO is that:
 2Z (zs;πs,τs) ≥ 1 + 2 δ
Is−1
or






Assumption 1(c) implies that Z−AI > Z. We now prove the result. Suppose
ﬁrst that Z (zs;πs,τs) ≥ Z. Then δ
Os−1 = AO and, since Z > Z, we also have
δ





Is−1 = AI and hence δ
Os−1 = 0. Finally, consider what happens when
Z (zs;πs,τs) < Z. Since Z − AI > Z, this implies that δ
Os−1 = 0. Thence
δ
Is−1 = 0. ￿
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